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A CASE STUDY OF THE DEMISE OF THE WHIG PRESIDENCY
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INTRODUCTION

The book, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington
1
to Bush, is one of a kind. I am proud to have been a part of the Symposium at which Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo initiated their
systematic study of the history of the unitary theory of the executive
2
that has culminated in the publication of this important, new book.
They have each been at the forefront, for more than decade, in illuminating the unitary theory of the executive—a theory that posits
that the Constitution should be construed as vesting in the person of
the President the complete control of the exercise of all executive
power. The Unitary Executive stands alone as the only constitutional
and political history of the ways in which each President from George
Washington to George W. Bush implemented or exercised power
upon the basis of the unitary theory of the executive. It is no overstatement to say that Chris Yoo and Steve Calabresi have done more
than any other scholars to refine our understanding of the unitary
theory of the executive. If there is an instance, prior to 2005, of a
President’s acting on the basis of the unitary theory of the executive,
it is in this book.
But, my purpose in joining this Symposium is not simply to praise
Chris and Steve for their outstanding work. My focus is less on what
they discuss in their excellent book than on what is not discussed. To
their credit, Calabresi and Yoo acknowledge that different Presidents
have expressed varying degrees of commitment to the unitary theory
of the executive. Nevertheless, their account is not, nor does it pur*
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port to be, a comprehensive survey of the interaction among the
branches pertaining to the scope of presidential power. The overriding, singular focus of their book risks leading its readers to overestimate the extent to which the unitary theory of the executive has actually been implemented or followed in American history.
Consequently, the book has the same strengths—and limitations, I
dare say—of a book on congressional power that primarily focused
on the instances in which Congress has claimed the primacy of its authority in particular realms of constitutional authority or of a book on
judicial supremacy that focused primarily on the instances in which
the Court struck down legislative or executive actions. I suspect that
Steve and Chris would agree that these other books might have limited utility in elucidating the general scope of their respective subjects. I fear their book might be vulnerable to a similar critique: its
limitations arise from its focus. It is a theory in search of a proof, and
thus the book does not pause to consider all the times that Presidents
did not follow, or the judiciary or Congress rejected, the unitary theory of the executive. While Professors Calabresi and Yoo presumably
set forth all the possible support they have found within historical
practices for the unitary theory of the executive, the readers of their
book will have to look elsewhere for a more comprehensive analysis
of how often (or rarely) this theory has been endorsed or implemented as compared to other conceptions of presidential or executive power. No doubt, their study will help us better understand
presidential power and particularly the unitary theory of the executive; however, the understanding of presidential power cannot be
based on this book or its account alone. To put this point slightly differently, the overriding concern of The Unitary Executive is departmentalism—“the notion that all three branches of the federal government
3
are coequal interpreters of the Constitution” —but it is departmentalism almost entirely from the perspective of only the President. Their
spotlight on departmentalism is primarily focused on one end of
Pennsylvania Avenue, even though comprehension of departmentalism, even as they have defined it, requires a bigger spotlight. To appreciate departmentalism in constitutional law we need a broader
perspective, a more complete account, of presidential power.
The unitary theory of the executive has not been conceived or
forged in a vacuum; it is a function, like every aspect of checks and
balances, of the interaction of all three branches. The departments
are shaped by and shape each other through their interaction—the
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confluence of their efforts to govern the internal operations and decision making of themselves and to extend the boundaries or fend off
encroachments from other constitutional authorities upon the boundaries of their respective powers. Departmentalism is shaped by the
exercise of coordinate powers not only at particular times or periods
but also over time. As demonstrated in their book, Professors Calabresi and Yoo recognize the need to demonstrate how this theory has
fared in practice. But, a complete, positive account of this theory requires knowing more than they tell us; it ultimately requires knowing
how all the different theories of presidential power have fared in
practice and thus entails an analysis of all the times that the unitary
theory of the executive was not followed and what alternative conceptions of presidential power were embraced instead.
In light of what I consider to be the importance of a more detailed analysis of the evolution of presidential power over time, my
Essay consists of three Parts. In Part I, I discuss three concepts that I
suggest are basic for illuminating the development of presidential
power over time. The first of these is departmentalism, whose significance the authors clearly recognize. The second is constitutional
construction, which is the dynamic process through which nonjudicial branches influence or shape constitutional practices and un4
derstandings. If the unitary theory of the executive is to be implemented or established at all or when departments each assert or try to
protect their particular prerogatives, it will be through this process;
however, this process is a dynamic one in which powers are shaped
not in a vacuum but rather through the give and take—the interaction—among the political branches. To appreciate how the unitary
theory of the executive has fared in practice, we need to appreciate
how the interaction between the branches and among Presidents has
shaped the understanding of executive power over time. The third
concept essential to the understanding of departmentalism, constitutional construction, and the development of presidential power, is
5
non-judicial precedent. By the latter, I mean the past constitutional
decisions or acts of non-judicial actors that public authorities seek,
for whatever reason, to invest with normative authority. Constitutional construction produces non-judicial precedents, and presiden-
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tial powers develop through the accretion of non-judicial precedents.
In fact, the Court has been peripheral by and large on questions regarding separation of powers over the years. Judicial review will only
tell us a little about the constitutional foundations of the unitary theory of the executive, while non-judicial precedent will tell us more.
Part II is a case study of the demise of the Whig conception of the
presidency—the notion that the President should be subservient to
6
the will of Congress on all domestic policymaking. Professors Calabresi and Yoo talk about each of the Presidents who helped to bury
7
the Whig conception of the presidency, but the case study provides a
more detailed examination of departmentalism at work in an important, twelve year period of American history.
In the third and final Part, I consider more fully several lessons
that can be derived from the case study in Part II. First, it shows how
the Constitution actually matters. Contrary to the suggestion of many
scholars (particularly those who focus on courts), the case study
shows how several people who became President acted contrary to
their political and even their self-interest once they took office. Second, the case study contradicts the conventional wisdom that, prior to
the Civil War, the only Presidents who strongly defended, or asserted,
presidential prerogatives from the 1820s to 1861 were Andrew Jackson and James Polk. In fact, this is wrong; the demise of the Whig
conception of the presidency shows us that several other Presidents in
the Antebellum era actually followed Jackson’s and Polk’s model of
the presidency rather than the competing one advanced by the Whig
Party. The fact that Presidents were unpopular or did not achieve all
they wanted to achieve does not mean they were weak chief executives. Third, the case study underscores the significance of constitutional decision making outside the Court. The Whig conception of
the presidency died as a result of the interaction of the political
branches and without the involvement of the Court at all. It is thus,
at the very least, a cautionary tale against overestimating the relevance of judicial review to the development of executive or legislative
power over time. Fourth, the case study underscores the importance
of the dynamic relationship between the Congress and the President
in burying this notion of the presidency and in influencing the understandings and exercise of executive power. The case study shows
how Congress pushed back almost every single time that the four
6
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nominally Whig Presidents tried to advance their notions of the
presidency in opposition to the dominant thinking in Congress.
Presidential power advanced in those years, but so too did congressional power. Fifth, the case study is a reminder of the importance of
not confusing a defense of presidential prerogatives with the unitary
theory of the executive. Fuller accounts of departmentalism show
that even as these Presidents were rebelling against the Whig conception of the presidency they were not seeking to implement the unitary theory of the executive. Last but not least, there are two normative consequences to my case study. The first is the practical
impossibility of judicial supremacy; judicial supremacy is not a fact of
constitutional life, nor has it ever been. The fact is that presidential
power has largely developed on the basis of non-judicial precedent to
which the courts generally defer. The second is that the unitary theory of the executive will never be fully implemented. This theory has
never been fully implemented because it is in tension with substantial
numbers of judicial and non-judicial precedents. Indeed, it could
only be implemented if there were a complete abdication of congressional authority. If past is prologue, presidential power has never
grown without the acquiescence or assistance of the Congress, and
Congress has never abdicated so much of its authority as to allow full
and complete presidential control of all executive action to take root
in our constitutional order.
I. SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
In this Part, I discuss the significance of three concepts to understanding the development of presidential power. These concepts are
departmentalism, constitutional construction, and non-judicial
precedent. It is not a problem for The Unitary Executive that it only
discusses the first of these, at least explicitly. The constitutional
scheme of checks and balances does not depend on the players thinking of, or knowing about, these concepts, though they might help to
illuminate how this scheme works over time.
A. Departmentalism
The concept of departmentalism is at the heart of The Unitary Executive. The concept refers to the efforts of each branch to claim and
to act upon the unilateral authority to interpret the Constitution.
There is no question that, as The Unitary Executive suggests, depart-
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mentalism has long been an undeniable fact of constitutional life in
8
the United States.
To appreciate departmentalism, two clarifications, beyond those
made in The Unitary Executive, are helpful. First, Calabresi and Yoo
treat departmentalism as synonymous with “coordinate constitutional
9
interpretation,” but it is important to know coordinate constitutional
interpretation with respect to what. Not all coordinate constitutional
interpretation is the same, even as a descriptive matter; different interpretations have different effects, and different interpretations may
be advanced with greater intensity and success. When, for instance,
Congress makes rules for its internal governance, it is acting upon a
unilateral interpretation of the Constitution and, at the same time,
helping to shape how it, as a department, looks. But, when Congress
passes a law that seeks to strip the federal courts of virtually any jurisdiction over claims that might be raised against the conditions under
which the American military, pursuant to presidential or congressional directives, may detain—or hold in custody—citizens or non10
citizens, departmentalism hardly seems to capture all that is going
on. On the one hand, the Supreme Court might be protecting its
own unilateral authority by striking down the law. But, on the other
hand, the Court might be protecting individual rights from being violated by the other branches. The difficulty is that the term departmentalism seems to insufficiently capture the nature and complexity
of the constitutional interaction among the branches. The shapes of
each department turn on at least some decisions of the authorities in
all three branches, and while there are many instances in which the
leaders of a branch are in agreement over the scope of their respective powers, they are not in agreement on everything. Recall, for example, the fundamentally different notions that Theodore Roosevelt
and his successor William Howard Taft had of the presidency—
Roosevelt construed all the gaps and ambiguities of the constitutional
text in favor of presidential power while Taft took exactly the opposite position of restricting presidential authority solely to the express
11
grants of power vested in the office in the Constitution. The possibilities of different leaders of the branches favoring different concep-
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tions of their own powers as well as that of the other branches indicate the limitations of the descriptive power of departmentalism,
standing alone or without further elaboration.
B. Constitutional Construction
A second concept that can help to clarify departmentalism in our
constitutional order is constitutional construction. Political scientist
Keith Whittington has given the most extensive explanation of the
12
utility of the conception of constitutional construction. According
to Whittington, this concept captures the differences in how the political branches and the Supreme Court make constitutional law: in
deciding the constitutional cases or controversies that come before it,
the Court will have its chance to expound upon the meaning of the
Constitution, but the political branches have opportunities as well,
with the critical difference being that their decisions and the circumstances in which they make them are infused with political considera13
tions. While the Justices are heavily discouraged, to say the least,
from taking any political considerations into account in interpreting
the Constitution, national political leaders are not. The point of constitutional construction is that Presidents and members of Congress
make decisions or take actions with discernible constitutional ramifications apart from the fact that they are infused with politics. The
political costs, benefits, incentives, or disincentives that particular
Presidents or members of Congress might have had in time should
not obscure the constitutional ramifications or significance of their
decisions. Constitutional construction is a dynamic process in which
the meaning of the Constitution can be and often is shaped as a result of, or through, the interaction of national political leaders on
questions of constitutional meaning or consequence.
Obviously, constitutional construction is hardly the exclusive province of Congress. As Whittington notes, the Johnson impeachment
trial had constitutional ramifications for both Congress and the President: it demonstrated the limits of using the impeachment and trial
authorities of the Congress to remove a President based on his differences of opinion over the constitutionality of laws that he had ve-
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14

toed. But, Johnson’s acquittal also effectively ratified the authority
of the President to veto legislation on whatever ground he deemed
appropriate, even one that was deplorable to the Congress. In addition, the Senate’s acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase, which occurred
several decades before Johnson’s acquittal, had its own constitutional
consequences, perhaps most importantly recognizing the limits of
congressional authority to impeach and remove a Supreme Court jus15
tice on the basis of some of his decisions.
The concept of constitutional construction reminds us that departments take their shape in pushing against and in being pushed
against by the other branches. Indeed, the Chase and Johnson impeachment trials illustrate how this interaction is not strictly confined
to the particular powers of each department to govern themselves.
The constitutional consequences of presidential-congressional interaction are not found or defined in forms as neat and as easily readable as judicial opinions, but they are evident nonetheless. Indeed,
they are most evident in the form of non-judicial precedent.
C. Non-Judicial Precedent
In both a recently published book and law review article, I examined at length the constitutional significance of non-judicial prece16
dent. I will not reiterate here the arguments made in those works,
but instead will review a few of the distinctive features of non-judicial
precedent and their ramifications for developing a positive account
of the scheme of checks and balances at work.
One of the most important contributions made by Calabresi and
Yoo is to underscore the importance of constitutional activity outside
the courts. Indeed, it is even more extensive than they suggest: the
Constitution explicitly vests Congress with seventy-five powers, the
17
President with fourteen, and the Vice President with five. Some of
these are familiar to most people, while many of them are not. Nevertheless, they are all deployed, and in almost every instance in which
they are being deployed these actors make judgments that either they

14
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or their successors have seen fit to try to invest with normative authority as precedents.
Moreover, most of these precedents are final or at least not overturned by the courts. To begin with, the Supreme Court may not
take cases in which the lower courts have upheld non-judicial consti18
tutional activity. Second, in most constitutional cases, the Court
employs either deferential judicial review or defers to non-judicial
precedents in such varied forms as historical practices, traditions, cus19
toms, and norms. Third, the Court’s standing and political question
doctrines have precluded many areas of non-judicial constitutional
20
decision making. Fourth, the courts uphold the vast majority of
21
non-judicial constitutional decisions that they review.
It is rare but admittedly not unprecedented for the Court to strike
down presidential or congressional constitutional decisions. On
22
these rare occasions, the presidential activity appears to directly
threaten the courts or Congress, and the courts are (perceived at
least) on the same side of the issue. Last but not least, there remain
vast areas of constitutional decision making that have never been and
23
are likely never to be subjected to searching judicial review. Each
department of the federal government has, in other words, extensive
responsibilities and powers that are not going to be influenced by or
even end up in a court of law.
Perhaps the most important ramification of these distinctive features of non-judicial precedents for the present Symposium is that
they ought to dissuade us from giving into the temptation of looking
to the courts for guidance or vindication of the unitary theory of the
executive. Judicial review has often been peripheral, if not irrelevant,
to the analysis of the unitary theory of the executive. To be sure, the
Supreme Court has in a few cases addressed the theory or arguments
24
related to it—but only a few. The significance of these decisions
should not be overstated, particularly when we recognize that both
Presidents and members of Congress have confronted this theory—or

18
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arguments related to it—on more occasions than the Court has. We
need to look outside the courts to the constitutional decisions and
practices of the other branches as they relate to presidential power.
We need to look, in other words, at the non-judicial precedents on
presidential power, particularly the unitary theory of the executive.
Hence, in the next Part, I turn to a closer look at an important series
of constitutional decisions made by Presidents and members of Congress over the course of twelve years on the critical question of
whether the President should be subservient to the will of Congress
on all matters of domestic policymaking.
II. THE DEMISE OF THE WHIG PRESIDENCY
In this Part, I examine the remarkably short life of the Whig conception of the presidency. This conception had been a fundamental
tenet of the Whig Party, which had been formed in opposition to
what its leaders believed was the usurpation of legislative power by
President Andrew Jackson. The name of the party was no accident; it
was taken to underscore its connection to the old, British “Whig” tradition that had heavily influenced the thinking of many of the leaders
of the American Revolution and that followed the republican ideal of
25
placing “the general good ahead of private interests.” No doubt,
another purpose of the party was to be a platform for Henry Clay, its
most prominent founder, to mount a successful run for the presidency. In spite of Clay’s popularity and the venerable tradition on
which the American Whig Party was based, it did not last long, and
the Whig conception of the presidency never took hold. Its demise
illustrates how departmentalism is a function of constitutional construction and non-judicial precedents, including those made by
Presidents who were not very memorable.
A. William Henry Harrison
Although William Henry Harrison was President for only four
weeks, his presidency was not constitutionally insignificant. If one
looks at what he did (and the reactions to his decisions) in the sixmonth period between his election and his death, his presidency is
significant at the very least because of the significant blows he struck
against the Whig conception of the presidency.

25
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Since Harrison was the first Whig to be elected President, the nation and, particularly, the leadership of his party expected at least two
things of him. The first was that he would not usurp legislative power
or act as tyrannically as Whigs believed Jackson and his successor,
Martin Van Buren, had done. The second was that he would be
committed to legislative supremacy, particularly in domestic policymaking. The Whigs conceived the President as a weak minister
whose principal responsibility was to submit to the will of the legislature.
But Harrison was not fully committed to either of these things.
Indeed, his first blow against the Whig conception of the presidency
was his steadfast refusal to accede to the demands of the leader of the
Whig Party, Henry Clay. Over the course of six meetings that occurred between Harrison and Henry Clay, his Party’s leader in Congress, Clay pressed Harrison in vain to accede to his leadership in
shaping the administration and domestic policy; and Harrison had to
26
remind Clay more than once that “you forget that I am President.”
In the aftermath of their final meeting, which was held shortly after
the inauguration, Harrison exploded at Clay’s impertinence after
Clay had sent him a letter with a proclamation directing Harrison to
call a special session of Congress to address the nation’s failing econ27
omy. After the exchange, Clay left Washington in disgust, and so
two weeks into his presidency, William Henry Harrison, the nation’s
first Whig President, was not speaking to the Whig leader in Congress. They were not speaking because Harrison had refused to follow Clay’s dictates on the organization and the priorities of his administration.
Harrison’s second blow to the Whig conception of the presidency
was his rejection of the Whig Party’s opposition to the principle of rotation in office of removing the political appointees of the prior administration and replacing them with loyal partisans. Six of Harrison’s predecessors had staunchly opposed the practice—George
Washington (in his second term), John Adams, James Madison, James
Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Martin Van Buren, while only two
of Harrison’s predecessors—Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson—
26

MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND CALHOUN 299
(1987); see also GEORGE RAWLINGS POAGE, HENRY CLAY AND THE WHIG PARTY 16–17 (reprint 1965) (1938) (discussing the tact with which Harrison handled Clay’s suggestions
regarding potential members of his Cabinet); GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE LIFE OF
HENRY CLAY 338–39 (1937) (discussing Clay’s desperate attempts to influence Harrison’s
Cabinet appointments and Harrison’s touchiness on the subject).
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28

had actually embraced it. Although he was the standard bearer of
the party that opposed Jackson’s implementation of the spoils system,
Harrison compiled a mixed record in keeping the pledge he had
made as the Whig candidate not to replace people solely for partisan
reasons. On the one hand, he vowed to reform “the spoils system and
29
opposed the wholesale removal of Democrats without cause.”
Moreover, Harrison’s Cabinet included Daniel Webster and Thomas
Ewing, both of whom had opposed the practice of rotation of office
30
when they were in the Senate. Harrison requested reports detailing
the activities and responsibilities of every office and “vowed to protect
31
officeholders who were performing their duties well.” On the other
hand, the pressure from Whig leaders to remove Democrats to make
way for their friends was enormous, and Harrison’s Cabinet voted to
make an extensive purge of Democrats. Postmaster General Francis
Granger probably had the highest numbers of dismissals: as one historian found, Granger, during his six months in office, had removed
39 of the 133 presidential postmasters, and by September 1841 almost 2,500
postmasters had been appointed in the lesser offices to vacancies most of
which were caused by removals. Granger later boasted that that he had removed 1,700 postmasters and had he remained [in the Cabinet] two or three
32
weeks longer, would have removed 3,000 more.

Harrison’s final blow against the Whig conception was the way in
which he used his Cabinet. The Constitution provides that a President “may require the [o]pinion, in writing, of the principal [o]fficer
in each of the executive [d]epartments, upon any [s]ubject relating
33
to the [d]uties of their respective [o]ffices.” While Thomas Jefferson had construed this language as allowing his Cabinet to vote on
the most important matters confronting the administration and vest34
ing in him the power to overrule their decisions if he saw fit, the
seven other Presidents who preceded Harrison did not believe the
Cabinet had any authority to bind them and differed only to the ex-

28
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PETERSON, supra note 27, at 39.
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PETERSON, supra note 27, at 39.
WHITE, supra note 28, at 311.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See 2 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 269–
79 (1951) (discussing Jefferson’s delegation of duties to different departments).
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tent to which they consulted their respective Cabinets. Nevertheless,
the six members of Harrison’s Cabinet believed in the Whig orthodoxy that they should guide and direct all of the President’s actions.
This belief derived from the Whigs’ conception that the presidency
should be subservient not just to Congress but to the Cabinet, which
existed, in their view, as an important check on executive usurpation
36
of legislative authority. While Harrison’s Cabinet allowed him to
preside over their meetings, they dictated that decisions should be
made by majority rule, with each cabinet member having a single vote
and allowing Harrison to cast a tie-breaking vote if the Cabinet was
37
deadlocked.
Though Harrison initially followed his Cabinet’s preferred method of decision making, he began to disagree. The most dramatic
confrontation arose when Webster informed Harrison that the Cabinet had decided to reject his preferred candidate and instead to appoint James Wilson as the Governor of Iowa. After a prolonged silence, Harrison wrote a few words on a slip of paper which he asked
Webster to read to the Cabinet. The message was succinct: “William
38
Henry Harrison, President of the United States.” Harrison then
rose to his feet and angrily told the Cabinet: “William Henry Harrison, President of the United States, tells you, gentlemen, that by ____,
39
John Chambers shall be Governor of Iowa.” The aggregation and
consistent pattern of Harrison’s protestations against being pressured
into following the Whig conception of the presidency leads to the
conclusion that once in office (and freed from the need to run for reelection), Harrison seems to have recognized the need to protect the
prerogatives and institutional needs of the presidency. His rebukes
reflect his growing resistance to the Whig conception of the presidency.
B. John Tyler
Initially, Whig leaders hoped that Harrison’s Vice President and
successor in office, John Tyler, would not be as resistant as Harrison
had become to the Whig conception of the presidency. Tyler had left

35
36
37
38
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See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 28, at 93 (discussing the tendency of some Presidents to depend heavily on the Cabinet).
PETERSON, supra note 27, at 40 (describing the Whig strategy of appointing a Cabinet to
direct the President in order to eliminate executive usurpation).
See WHITE, supra note 28, at 93 (explaining that Harrison’s heavy dependence on his
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Recollections of an Old Stager, HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAG., June-Nov. 1873, at 753, 754.
PETERSON, supra note 27, at 41 (underscored omission in original).
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the Democratic Party to protest Andrew Jackson’s usurpation and
consolidation of executive power and voted to censure Jackson in
40
1834. Whig leaders did not believe Tyler would have the temerity to
challenge their orthodoxy in light of his longstanding friendship with
Clay, his having not been elected President in his own right, and his
being the youngest person up until that time to serve as President.
But, Whig leaders failed to appreciate Tyler’s longstanding fidelity
to the principles of the Democratic Party, including his support for
Jackson’s election in 1828 and reelection in 1832. Indeed, the first
thing Tyler did, upon learning of Harrison’s death, was to reject the
Whig position on his status. Although the Whigs, including those in
his Cabinet, believed that the powers but not the office of the presidency had devolved upon Tyler, Tyler informed the six members of
the Cabinet in his first meeting with them and then the nation in a
41
short address afterwards that he construed the Constitution as authorizing the Vice President to succeed automatically to the office of
the presidency upon the President’s death. In spite of the fact that
the Whigs controlled the Congress, the House and the Senate, each
with a few dissenters, quickly approved of Tyler’s reading of the Con42
stitution in separate resolutions.
Second, John Tyler broke dramatically with Whig orthodoxy with
his exercises of the President’s veto authority. Whig leaders had long

40
41

42

For a recent, thorough biography of John Tyler, see EDWARD P. CRAPOL, JOHN TYLER:
THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT (2006).
President John Tyler, Inaugural Address (April 9, 1841), in 4 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 36 (1897)
(delivering his inaugural address upon assuming office).
The pertinent constitutional language was ambiguous: “In Case of the Removal of the
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress . . . [shall declare] what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. The question was whether “the same” refers to the office or the
presidency’s powers and duties. Prominent authorities had divided over whether “the
same” meant that a Vice President should automatically become President in his own
right and continue therein until the expiration of the term, or that a Vice President could
only act as President upon a sitting President’s death and had no entitlement to claim the
office for himself since he had not been formally elected President. Tyler opted for the
first reading, while Whig leaders opted for the latter. The seven other Vice Presidents
who succeeded to the presidency are Millard Fillmore (1850), Andrew Johnson (1865),
Chester Arthur (1881), Theodore Roosevelt (1901), Calvin Coolidge (1923), Harry Truman (1945), and Lyndon Johnson (1963). The repetition reinforced Tyler’s succession
as a significant constitutional precedent. In 1967, Tyler’s precedent was officially codified
with the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. In the only application of this
Amendment, Gerald Ford became President when Richard Nixon resigned from office in
1974.
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objected to both vetoes and pocket vetoes, claiming that the former
should be restricted only to bills that were plainly unconstitutional
43
and the latter were just plainly unconstitutional. Whigs believed
that a President was constitutionally obliged to sign a bill or to veto it
and that exercising vetoes on the basis of a President’s own, separate
constitutional constructions, as Jackson had done, was nothing more
than an illegitimate usurpation of legislative authority. Nevertheless,
Tyler cast six vetoes—the largest number cast by any antebellum Pres44
ident, including Jackson; and his four pocket vetoes were the second
most cast by an antebellum President. But, the constitutional significance of Tyler’s vetoes depends less on their number than on the fact
that he claimed a broad basis for them, including constitutional, pol45
icy, and even moral objections to the legislation he was vetoing. In
exercising vetoes on whatever grounds he deemed appropriate, Tyler
was following Jackson’s example rather than the Whig orthodoxy that
the veto only be used on plainly unconstitutional legislation.
Third, Tyler rejected the Whig orthodoxy on the role of the Cabinet. In his first meeting with his Cabinet, Tyler not only rejected its
view on presidential succession but also its entitlement to make decisions for the administration based on a majority vote. Tyler immediately objected that he did not believe that cabinet members were coequal with the President and that
I can never consent to being dictated to act as to what I shall or shall not
do. I, as President, shall be responsible for my administration. I hope to
have your hearty co-operation in carrying out its measures. So long as
you see fit to do this, I shall be glad to have you with me. When you
46
think otherwise, your resignations will be accepted.

43
44

45
46

See generally WHITE, supra note 28, at 30–33 (describing the Whigs’ criticism of the veto
power).
See 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 63 (relaying President John Tyler’s Veto Message to
the Senate on August 16, 1841, vetoing a bill to incorporate the Fiscal Bank of the United
States); id. at 68 (relaying John Tyler’s Veto Message to the House of Representatives on
September 9, 1841, vetoing the Fiscal Incorporation Bill); id. at 180 (relaying Veto Message of June 29, 1842, vetoing a bill to extend for a limited time the present laws for laying and collecting duties on imports); id. at 183 (relaying Veto Message of August 9, 1842,
vetoing a bill to provide revenue from imports); id. at 366 (relaying Veto Message of February 20, 1845, vetoing a bill relating to revenue cutters and steamers); 39 JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 140–43 (D.C., Blair & Rives 1844)
(relaying Veto Message of June 11, 1844, vetoing a bill to make improvements of harbors
and rivers). Congress’s subsequent override of the latter veto was the first time that it had
overridden a presidential veto.
See supra text accompanying note 43.
WHITE, supra note 28, at 86 (quoting Frank G. Carpenter, A Talk with a President’s Son, 41
LIPPINCOTT'S MONTHLY MAG. 416, 418 (1888)) (relating John Tyler’s informing his Cabinet members that he will accept their resignations if they choose not to carry out his prescribed measures).
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Thus, in the first meeting with his Cabinet, Tyler twice rejected
following the Whigs’ preferred practices of a President’s deferring to
his Cabinet and acquiescing to its views. Moreover, he not only rejected the Cabinet’s advice that he sign the Fiscal Corporation bill
but also gladly accepted the mass resignation of the Cabinet (except
47
for Webster) to protest his veto of that bill. Tyler quickly nominated
48
five people who would be loyal to him, not to the Whig elite. Although Clay hoped to stall the nominations because Tyler had not
consulted with him, the Senate confirmed them all in record time.
While there were subsequent shifts in the Cabinet’s composition, Tyler never wavered on his conception of the Cabinet. He only consulted it when he saw fit and only followed its counsel when it accorded with his own views.
Tyler’s refusal to consult with congressional leadership on his cabinet nominations was not unique. Throughout his presidency, Tyler
rejected the Whig principle that he should consult with the congressional leadership on all his nominations, and instead strongly defended his prerogative as President to exercise his nominating authority as he saw fit. In spite of fierce, persistent opposition in the
Senate, Tyler established several significant precedents bolstering the
President’s independent, unilateral authority to make nominations to
confirmable offices as he saw fit.
First, Tyler made the significant decision, after his expulsion from
the Whig Party, to use patronage to ensure loyalty to his policies
throughout his administration and to build support for a run for the
presidency in 1844. Indeed, in his nearly four years in office, Tyler
remade his Cabinet more than once, and his efforts to reconstruct a
Cabinet to meet his shifting political fortunes and needs were historic: twenty-one different people filled the six different posts during
Tyler’s presidency, the largest number of cabinet appointments made
by a single President until Ulysses Grant (who made twenty-five cabinet appointments over the course of two full terms to fill seven cabinet offices). Including the cabinet secretaries that Tyler had inherited from Harrison, there were three Secretaries of State (including
Daniel Webster at the beginning and John Calhoun at the end of his
administration), four Secretaries of War, four Treasury Secretaries,

47

See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 72–86 (describing the turmoil within Tyler’s Cabinet following his vetos, and the subsequent resignation of many cabinet members).

48

Id. at 87 (describing Tyler’s quick nomination of cabinet members who would be loyal to
him).
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three Attorneys General, two Postmasters General, and five Navy Sec49
retaries.
In response to Senate opposition to his efforts to assert his nominating authority independently, Tyler turned to his recess appointment authority. With the counsel of Hugh Legare, his widely respected, second Attorney General, Tyler asserted that he could use
his recess appointment authority to make recess appointments at any
time because of the “overruling necessity” of the President’s constitutional responsibility of exercising “the whole executive power” “per50
petual[ly]” and with “no interruption” by the Congress. Hence, Tyler justified his making recourse to his recess appointment authority
whenever, in his judgment, Congress had gone too far (and too long)
in obstructing his efforts to fill a vacancy.
Tyler’s broad construction of his power to nominate whom he
pleased and to make recess appointments when he felt necessary included his resistance (and vigorous protests) against efforts by the
House to encroach upon his appointment power. On March 16,
1842, the House approved a resolution requesting that
[T]he President of the United States and the heads of the several Departments be requested to communicate to the House of Representatives the
names of such of the members (if any) of the Twenty-sixth and Twentyseventh Congress who have been applicants for office, and for what offices,
distinguishing between those who have applied in person, and those whose
51
applications were made by friends, whether in person or by writing.

A week later, Tyler submitted to the House a formal Protest in
which he explained that his refusal to comply with the resolution on
the grounds that, among other things, “compliance with the resolution . . . would be a surrender of duties and powers which the Consti52
tution has conferred exclusively on the Executive.” He explained
that

49

50
51

52

See generally id. at 146. Of the twenty-one different people who served in Tyler’s Cabinet,
thirteen were Whigs and eight were Democrats. But, at least some turnover was not the
fault of either Tyler or the Congress. In February 1844, Tyler and several dignitaries were
present at a demonstration of the unveiling of the U.S.S. Princeton’s new weapon, which
was then supposed to be the largest naval gun. On the third discharge, the weapon exploded at the breech and killed several of the spectators, including Tyler’s Secretary of
State and Navy Secretary.
Power of President to Fill Vacancies, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 673, 675–76 (1841) (describing the
power of the President to fill vacancies that may happen during the recess of Senate).
See 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 105 (describing John Tyler’s refusal to comply with
the House of Representatives’ request that the President provide correspondence with
the House regarding members of the 26th and 27th Congresses).
Id at 106.
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The appointing power, so far as it is bestowed on the President by the Constitution, is conferred without reserve or qualification. The reason for the
appointment and the responsibility of the appointment, rest with [the President] alone. I can not perceive anywhere in the Constitution . . . any right
conferred on the House . . . to hear the reasons which an applicant may urge
for an appointment to office under the executive department, or any duty
resting upon the House . . . by which it may become responsible for any such
53
appointment.

Tyler’s defense of the President’s authority to keep the House from
encroaching upon (or even inquiring into) the domain of his appointment authority was no different than Jackson’s before him or
Polk’s afterwards.
Tyler’s next assault on the Whig conception of the presidency was
his decision, like that of Harrison before him, to support rather than
to oppose the principle of rotation in office. Indeed, Tyler moved
quickly, once he became President, to replace disloyal officials with
those who were personally loyal to him; this practice merely intensified—rather than initiated—once he was expelled from the Whig
Party. In 1841 alone, Tyler and Harrison removed over 300 officials—the most in any single year in the Antebellum era except for
54
Jackson’s first year in office. Bolstering Tyler’s construction of his
removal authority were several official opinions of Attorney General
Legare that would influence subsequent thinking and practice per55
taining to the President’s removal power.
Tyler struck yet another blow to the Whig orthodoxy on the presidency when he rejected the party’s basic tenet that a President should
serve for only a single term. Once Tyler came into office, he pointedly did not pledge, as Whig leaders believed a President should, to
serve only a single term in office. His silence, coupled with the fact
that by 1842 Tyler was plainly employing his appointment and re56
moval powers to support a run for the presidency in 1844, ended

53
54
55

56

Id.
CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 150 (1904) (describing the
sweep of removals from office that occurred in 1841).
See Power of President to Fill Vacancies, supra note 50 (describing the power of the President to fill vacancies that may happen during the recess of Senate); 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 1–
2 (1842) (opining on the military power of the President to dismiss from service); see also
Appointment and Removal of Inspectors of Customs, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 165, 166 (1843)
(suggesting that “in a proper case” a cabinet secretary “has the authority and discretion
[to reject any officer without the consent of the collector] until his power in this particular be expressly restrained by act of Congress”).
See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 168, 174–76 (describing Tyler’s strategic cabinet staffing
to support his future presidential run).
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any doubt about Tyler’s refusal to abide by the Whig commitment to
a limited presidential term.
Tyler’s final blow to the Whig conception of the presidency was
his refusal to defer, at least routinely, to resolutions passed by the
House and the Senate throughout his presidency that demanded that
he turn over to one or the other particular documents or information
that were in either his or the executive branch’s possession. More of57
ten than not, he complied with the resolutions, but on three occasions he submitted for publication in the congressional record his
reasons for refusing to comply with particular document requests
58
from the House.
It is, however, significant that Congress attempted to retaliate
against each of the blows that Tyler struck against the Whig conception of the presidency. First, in response to Tyler’s vetoes of legislation in June and August of 1842, the House appointed a special
committee to investigate whether President Tyler had committed an
59
impeachable offense. The resolution to appoint the committee was
in fact the first request to initiate a presidential impeachment to be
formally introduced in the House. In early August, the House referred Tyler’s message to the special committee that Clay’s close
friend, the Speaker of the House, John White, appointed, and whose
members included not only John Quincy Adams as chair but also the
man who had introduced the impeachment resolution against Tyler,
John Botts. A week later, the select committee issued a report that
harshly criticized Tyler’s actions, particularly his vetoes of the two
bills attempting to re-charter a national bank, for the “gross abuse of
constitutional power, and bold assumptions of powers never vested in
him by any law”; for “depriv[ing] the people of self-government”; for
57

58

59

Two examples are the House’s and Senate’s respective resolutions requesting Tyler to
identify the officials whom he had removed from office. Notably, then-Senator James Buchanan sponsored the resolution that the Senate approved, while the House approved an
identical resolution on July 16, 1841. Tyler did not resist either of these resolutions, since
he construed them as merely requesting information that was already public—namely,
the names of officials who had been removed and were no longer in office.
See Letter from President John Tyler to the House of Representatives (Feb. 26, 1842), in
37 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 447 (D.C., Gales
& Seaton 1841) (detailing the Blair & Rives legislation); President John Tyler, Protest to
the House of Representatives (Mar. 23, 1842), in 4 RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 105
(describing his refusal to comply with the House of Representatives’ request that the
President provide correspondence with the House regarding members of the 26th and
27th Congresses); President John Tyler, Special Message (Jan. 31, 1843), in 4
RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 220 (submitting a report from the War Department in
compliance with the House resolution requesting communication to certain queries).
See generally PETERSON, supra note 27, at 101–07 (describing the events leading to the formation of the House special committee and its report criticizing President Tyler).
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“assum[ing] . . . the
whole
legislative
power
to
himself,
and . . . levying millions of money upon the people, without any authority of law”; and for the “abusive exercise of the constitutional
power of the President to arrest the actions of Congress upon meas60
ures vital to the welfare of the people.” Significantly, the report
found that although Tyler’s actions justified the invocation of the
federal impeachment process, it did not recommend impeachment
because “in the present condition of public affairs, [it would] prove
61
abortive.” Furthermore, the report was not unanimous: Representatives Charles Ingersoll of Pennsylvania and James Roosevelt of New
York, both Democrats, issued a minority report that defended Tyler,
and Thomas Gilmer, a Virginia Whig who remained loyal to Tyler,
62
went further to submit a counter-report. Ingersoll and Roosevelt
defended the President’s authority to veto bills on any ground he
deemed appropriate, while Gilmer accused the House of violating
tradition and the spirit of the Constitution by referring Tyler’s veto to
a committee, instead of, as the Constitution specified, entering “the
objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider [the
63
bill].”
Gilmer told the House that the Constitution did not make
the President’s veto absolute but specified that it could be overridden
64
if there was adequate support in the House and Senate. Meanwhile,
Senator James Buchanan took to the floor of the Senate to defend
the legality of Tyler’s actions. After virtually no discussion, the
House, on August 17, 1842, approved and adopted the report by a
65
vote of 100-80. This vote marked the first time that the House had
censured—or formally approved a resolution that was critical of—a
President. On August 30, 1842, Tyler delivered a formal Protest to

60
61
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64

65

CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 894–96 (1842) (quoting the select committee’s report).
Id. at 896.
Near the end of his administration, Tyler selected Gilmer, a former Virginia Governor, to
serve as Secretary of the Navy. Shortly after receiving the appointment, Gilmer was killed
in the tragic misfiring of a new cannon on the U.S.S. Princeton. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 896 (1842).
See id. at 896–99 (quoting Gilmer’s report discussing how Congress could proceed in
overriding the President’s veto); see also CARLTON JACKSON, PRESIDENTIAL VETOES 1792–
1945, at 71–72 (1967) (describing Gilmer’s protest and counter report).
See House Vote on the Report of the Select Committee (Aug. 17, 1842), in 37 JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 58, at 1343, 1346–52
(detailing the House vote on the Select Committee’s report criticizing President Tyler’s
veto).
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66

the House; however, citing the Senate’s refusal to publish Jackson’s
Protest of his censure by the Senate in 1834, the House refused to
publish Tyler’s protest, which was grounded in the same reasoning
67
Jackson had cited in his earlier Protest.
Although the House censured Tyler through its adoption of the
special committee’s critical report of Tyler, the House did not approve its recommendation of a constitutional amendment to enable
Congress to override a presidential veto by a simple majority and in
1843 voted 127-83 to reject the impeachment resolution introduced
68
against Tyler. The House’s failures to impeach Tyler and to approve
amending the President’s veto authority constitute significant precedents that seem to validate Tyler’s construction of presidential prerogatives.
Second, the Senate used its Advice and Consent power to retaliate
against Tyler’s exercises of his appointment authorities. In Tyler’s
nearly four years as the President, the Senate rejected seven of his
twenty cabinet nominations—the largest number of cabinet nomina69
tions ever made by a single President to be rejected by the Senate.
In Tyler’s last two years in office, the Senate blocked a majority of his
nominations (including four cabinet and two minister nominations),
rejected each of his three nominations of Henry Wise to be Minister
to France each time by an increasing margin, rejected by increasing
margins each of the three times that Tyler nominated Caleb Cushing
70
as Treasury Secretary, and rejected eight of Tyler’s nine nomina71
tions to fill two vacancies on the Supreme Court —the largest number of unsuccessful Supreme Court nominations ever made by a sin72
gle President.

66

67

68
69
70
71
72

See President Tyler, Protest to the House of Representatives, (Aug. 30, 1842), in 4
RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 190–93 (delivering a Protest in response to the August 17,
1842 bill).
See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
1833–1845, at 152–59 (1984) (describing Andrew Jackson’s Protest to the Senate and subsequent reactions).
See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 106, 109 (noting that the House’s vote to override Tyler’s
veto failed).
See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A HISTORICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 56, 106 (rev. ed. 2003).
Id. at 163, 164.
Id. at 56, 106.
In fact, Tyler nominated five different people to fill the two vacancies, only one of whom
the Senate confirmed. But, because he nominated several of the people more than once,
he ultimately made nine nominations, only one of which the Senate approved.
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None of the rejections had anything to do with the nominees’
73
credentials, which were generally quite good. Instead, the opposition arose primarily to keep one if not both vacancies unfilled so that
the incoming President, James Polk, could fill them. Mindful of the
reasons for the opposition, Tyler shrewdly chose as his last nominee
to fill one of the vacancies the universally respected Samuel Nelson,
the Democratic Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court. Democrats in the Senate figured the new President could do no better,
while Whigs quickly figured that Nelson was bound to be much more
agreeable to them than any of the people whom they thought Polk
was likely to nominate. On February 14, 1845, the Senate approved
the nomination by voice vote. Although the Senate’s obstruction of
Tyler’s efforts to fill both seats during the lame duck session of Congress in 1844–1845 is one of the first, clearest instances of the practice, now well-established, to stall such nominations in an election
year, Tyler’s successful nomination of Samuel Nelson to the Court illustrates the power that the Constitution vests even in a weak President, the power to forge compromises—or to build bridges between
the parties—through the exercise of the nominating authority. The
Constitution neither requires nor prohibits a President to avoid conflict, or to achieve consensus, through his exercise of his nominating
authority. With his successful nomination of Nelson to the Court, Tyler became the first President to reach across the aisle to nominate
someone from the opposition party to the Supreme Court. His success was not lost on subsequent Presidents, even more popular ones,
who were interested in attaining bipartisan consensus on their ap74
pointments to the Court.
C. Zachary Taylor
Over the course of the next eight years, the Whig conception of
the presidency took a pounding from which it never recovered. In
the first four of those eight years, James Polk, a Democrat, modeled
himself on the antithesis of the Whig conception of the presidency:

73

See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS
SUPREME COURT 105–06 (2d ed. 1985) (describing the credentials of Tyler’s Supreme Court nominees).
TO THE

74

In fact, Abraham Lincoln would be the first of ten Presidents to follow Tyler’s example in
nominating someone from outside his party to the Supreme Court. The other Presidents
to do this were Benjamin Harrison, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Warren
Harding, Herbert Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and
Richard Nixon.
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75

Andrew Jackson. The election of another Whig President, Zachary
Taylor, in 1848, renewed the hopes of the Whig Party that its conception of the presidency might finally be realized. But, Taylor quickly
dashed these hopes. First, and most importantly, in his first—and only—annual message, Taylor laid out the single, boldest proposal of his
administration—allowing Congress to vote separately on the admis76
sions of California and New Mexico as new states into the Union.
Taylor’s plan was bold for at least two reasons. First, he did not
defer to what congressional leaders wanted to do on the admission of
new states into the Union. Instead, he asserted his authority as President to call upon Congress to defer to his proposal and thus to consider separately the applications of California and New Mexico for
statehood. While most members of Congress either opposed or favored not voting on Taylor’s plan, Missouri Senator Thomas Hart
Benton, a Democrat, vigorously defended Taylor’s plan as closely adhering to the historical practice of unconditionally admitting new
states. In response to demands that the admission of new states be
conditioned on their acceptance of slavery, Benton proclaimed on
the Senate floor that
[D]uring the sixty years in which we have been admitting new States into the
Union, there had been no example of combining any other subject with the
question of the admission of a State . . . . I deem it a very material thing, as it
is proposed that we should now commence with doing by a new State what is
without precedent in the annals of legislation, and which many feel to be a
deep indignity to that State, that I shall, by reference to the cases of admis77
sion of new States, show that such a thing has never been done before.

Moreover, it was widely understood that Taylor’s plan of admitting
California and New Mexico as new states would dramatically tip the
balance of power in the Senate (and thus the Union) in favor of anti78
slavery forces. While Taylor believed that his proposal had the advantage of avoiding a debate in Congress over the regulation of slavery in the territories, it upset members of Congress who believed it
was their prerogative to decide whether or not (as well as the extent
of their power) to regulate California and New Mexico as territories.
While Taylor construed the Constitution as not requiring Congress to

75
76
77
78

See generally JOHN SEIGENTHALER, JAMES K. POLK (2004).
See President Zachary Taylor, First Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1849), in 5 RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 18–19.
CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1850).
See id. at 358–59 (noting Rep. Henry Washington Hilliard’s speech regarding the government of the territory acquired from Mexico by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
the impact on the South if California and New Mexico were admitted as new states).
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allow—or disallow—the extension of slavery into the territories, he
believed that a fight in Congress over its extension into the territories
risked disrupting the Union. He further believed his plan had the
advantage of respecting popular sovereignty (in following the will of
the people of California and New Mexico), a principle that would become the central tenet of the Democratic Party in the years to come.
Taylor knew his plan would be controversial, but urged that “we
should abstain from the introduction of those exciting topics of a sectional character which have hitherto produced painful apprehension
in the public mind; and I repeat the solemn warning of the first and
most illustrious of my predecessors against furnishing ‘any ground for
79
characterizing parties by geographic discriminations.’” Taylor’s re80
solve to stand by his plan proved “unconquerable” as its merits and
constitutionality were debated in Congress without end until he died
unexpectedly from cholera on July 9, 1850. His proposal had angered virtually every contingency in Congress but the northern
Whigs. These Whigs reluctantly accepted Taylor’s abandonment of
the Whigs’ conception of a weak presidency in exchange for his taking a position that actually fortified their opposition to the spread of
slavery and their support for the Wilmot Proviso, which the House of
Representatives had passed in 1847 and 1848 and which outlawed slavery in any federal territory to be acquired from Mexico (but exclud81
ing Texas which had been acquired before the Proviso’s passage).
When Taylor in special messages of January 21 and January 23, 1850,
82
defended his plan to Congress, it was not lost on anyone that he accepted in passing the constitutionality of the Wilmot Proviso.
Taylor’s second rejection of the Whig orthodoxy on the presidency arose in conjunction with his plan for the statehood of New
Mexico. Encouraged by Taylor, New Mexico, still under a military
governor, had made application for immediate statehood not only
under an anti-slavery constitution but also with an eastern boundary

79
80
81
82

Taylor, supra note 76, at 19.
ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY TAYLOR AND MILLARD FILLMORE 121
(1988).
See generally HOLT, supra note 25, at 266–83 (discussing Taylor and the Wilmot Proviso).
See President Zachary Taylor, Message to the Senate (Jan. 23, 1850), in 5 RICHARDSON,
supra note 41, at 26–30 (arguing for the admission of California and New Mexico as
states); see also Letter from Robert Toombs to John Crittenden (Apr. 23, 1850), in ULRICH
BONNELL PHILLIPS, THE LIFE OF ROBERT TOOMBS 65–66 (1913) (“When I came to Washington, as I expected, I found the whole Whig party expecting to pass the Proviso, and
that Taylor would not veto . . . . I saw Genl. T. and talked fully with him upon the subject,
and while he stated he had given and would give no pledges either way about the Proviso,
he gave me clearly to understand that if it was passed he would sign it.”).
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that Texas refused to accept. Indeed, no sooner had Taylor announced the plan than Texas authorities threatened to acquire, by
force if necessary, all the New Mexico territory east of the Rio
83
Grande, including Santa Fe. Texas authorities apparently were preparing to fight in order to extend the domain of slavery. If the
United States decided to intervene militarily to stop Texas, it was
likely a civil war would ensue. Nevertheless, Taylor, upon learning
that Texas might invade New Mexico, ordered federal troops to go to
Santa Fe. He directed the colonel in charge to prepare his troops to
84
rebuff any invasion of New Mexico. The federal troops garrisoned
in Santa Fe kept the Texas forces at bay, and a stalemate ensued that
was not broken until after Taylor’s death on July 9.
Taylor’s decision to send troops to thwart the threatened invasion
of New Mexico had enormous significance for the presidency. For
Taylor had not turned to Congress for any special authorization to
order federal troops to Santa Fe. We have no documents that spell
out his thinking on the subject. Instead, we must infer his likely reasoning from the actions he took, and it is possible to identify four
constitutional grounds to support his unilaterally ordering federal
troops to New Mexico. The first was it was consistent with his duty as
President of the United States to “take Care that the Laws be faith85
fully executed.” In this circumstance, the law he could have claimed
to have been trying to preserve had not yet been enacted—the bills
for admission of California and New Mexico as states. Yet, it is possible he might have thought that his authority as President to enforce
the laws faithfully empowered him to do whatever he felt was necessary to protect the integrity of the lawmaking process in Congress.
Second, Taylor’s ordering federal troops to protect New Mexico was
consistent with a belief that as the Commander-in-Chief of the United
States the President has unique, constitutional authority to put down
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See K. JACK BAUER, ZACHARY TAYLOR: SOLDIER, PLANTER, STATESMAN OF THE OLD
SOUTHWEST 294 (1985) (detailing Texas’s efforts to reclaim her territory).
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There is no executive order on record in which Taylor officially ordered federal troops to
thwart a Texas invasion into New Mexico. There is, however, correspondence and memoirs from the period—or later—confirming the series of steps Taylor took to defend New
Mexico as a “possession of the United States” against invasion by one of the United States.
See, e.g., Letter from General A. Pleasanton to Thurlow Weed (Sept. 22, 1876), in 2
THURLOW WEED BARNES, LIFE OF THURLOW WEED 180–81 (1970) (recounting a conversation with Taylor in which Taylor reportedly told Pleasanton that, “I am glad you are going
to New Mexico. I want officers of judgment and experience there. These southern men
in Congress are trying to bring on civil war. . . . Tell Colonel Monroe . . . he has my entire
confidence, and if he has not force enough out there to support him . . . I will be with you
myself. . . .”).
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a rebellion, and he might have viewed the threats made by Texas as
Texas threatening a rebellion against the authority of the United
States and the integrity (and boundaries) of the prospective State of
New Mexico. Third, Taylor’s actions were consistent with the belief
that the Constitution barred a state from interfering with, or undermining, a federal instrumentality, including federal territory. New
Mexico was federal territory—it belonged to the United States—and
he believed that no state could invade a territory of the United States.
Fourth, Taylor might have believed that in ordering federal troops,
even without special congressional authorization, he was acting both
to avert a civil war and to keep the Union intact. At least one prominent historian has intimated that had Taylor lived, his willingness to
use federal force to stop an invasion of New Mexico might have pre86
cipitated a civil war.
The third example of Taylor’s rejection of the Whig conception of
a weak presidency was the way in which he used his Cabinet. Contrary to Whig philosophy, he refused to allow the Whig leadership to
87
dictate his cabinet appointments. Hence, his Cabinet had no one
representing either the northeastern part of the country or the most
progressive wing of the Whig party. Instead, his Cabinet consisted
entirely of men who were personally loyal to him. In making these
and other appointments, Taylor primarily followed his own counsel
rather than that of the Whig leadership, which responded by block88
ing or rejecting most of his nominations to executive offices. Indeed, the very fact that Taylor chose not to abdicate his nominating
authority to influential Senators in exchange for their favors is further evidence of his rejection of the Whig conception of the presidency.
Moreover, Taylor, like Tyler before him, construed his recess appointment authority broadly to allow him to make temporary appointments to any offices that, for whatever reason, had not been
filled by the time of a recess (understood to be the then-lengthy period in between sessions). In fact, Taylor made 428 recess appoint89
ments.
86
87
88
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See 1 ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION 334 (1947) (predicting a schism between
Northern and Southern Whigs that might have resulted if Taylor had lived).
See generally BAUER, supra note 83, at 249–62 (describing the process by which Taylor assembled his Cabinet).
See HOLT, supra note 25, at 421 (describing the mechanisms utilized by the Whig leadership to delay Taylor’s appointments).
See Carl Russell Fish, Removal of Officials by the Presidents of the United States, in 1 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1899, at 78 (1900) (illustrating removals and appointments under Taylor).
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Taylor’s views on his removal authority were also antithetical to
the Whig conception of the presidency. Interestingly, both Whigs
and Democrats largely did not dispute Taylor’s constitutional author90
ity to replace Polk’s Cabinet with choices of his own. Taylor’s remarkable, unilateral decision to remove nearly two thirds of Polk’s
91
appointees during his first (and only full) year in office provoked
some debate in Congress but ultimately no other response.
Taylor went further to contemplate replacing most of his Cabi92
net. In fact, he intensified the effort in response to the biggest
scandal of his administration. The scandal resulted from an official
decision made by Taylor’s Attorney General to authorize Taylor’s
Treasury Secretary to pay the full amount of the interest on a claim
93
against the United States dating back to 1773. When it became
known that the interest was five times the size of the principal and
that half of the principal and half of the interest were to go to Taylor’s War Secretary, George Crawford, for his legal services on behalf
of the claimants, a public outcry arose. The matter festered for
months, while the House considered censuring the three members of
Taylor’s Cabinet involved in the scandal and Taylor mused about the
necessity of firing his entire Cabinet in order to remove any appear94
ances of corruption within his administration. The only other President before Taylor to have removed his entire Cabinet had been
95
Andrew Jackson, who had been the antithesis of the Whig conception of the presidency.
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91
92
93
94
95

In fact, Whigs were eager for Taylor to remove as many Democrats from federal offices as
possible to make the spots available to Whigs. See HOLT, supra note 25, at 418.
See SMITH, supra note 80, at 66 (detailing several of Taylor’s cabinet appointments among
the different factions of the Whig party).
See generally NEVINS, supra note 86, at 324–27 (examining the repurcussions in the Cabinet
following the Galphin scandal).
See Allowance of Interest on Claims, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 227–28 (1850) (ordering that
interest be paid to George Galphin on his claim against the United States).
See NEVINS, supra note 86, at 324–27; see also BAUER, supra note 83, at 312 (discussing any
potential wrongdoing in the interest payment to Galphin).
See Andrew Jackson, Protest to the Senate (Apr. 15, 1834), in 3 RICHARDSON, supra note
41, at 73 (arguing, inter alia, that “neither the President nor any other officer can be
rightfully subjected to the operation of the judicial power of the Senate except in the cases and under the forms prescribed by the Constitution”); id. at 76 (“If the House of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is just ground for the censure pronounced
upon the President, then will it be the solemn duty of that House to prefer the proper accusation and to cause him to be brought to trial by the constitutional tribunal.”).
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D. Millard Fillmore
Taylor’s death made Millard Fillmore, as ardent a Whig as there
ever was, the President of the United States. But, over the course of
his thirty-three months as President, Fillmore often rejected the Whig
conception of the presidency. First, he took the initiative in helping
to steer the passage of the Compromise of 1850 in Congress. The
Whig conception of the presidency would have required Fillmore to
sign the bill, which he did, but it had never countenanced a President’s taking a leadership role and in his using all of his other powers, as Fillmore did, to push the controversial bill through the Con96
gress.
Second, Fillmore, like Jackson and Polk before him, vigorously defended the principle of rotation in office. On his second day in office, Fillmore became the first President to accept the resignation of
97
his entire Cabinet. Although he asked the cabinet members to stay
for a month while he reorganized his government, they all left within
a week of his inauguration. When he came into office, Fillmore also
“gave directions that the dissident wing of the Whigs [in his admini98
stration] should be turned out in favor of ‘real’ Whigs.” Webster
alone was responsible for helping Taylor to remove 60% of the politi99
cal appointees in the State Department. By seeking nearly a widescale removal of personnel from within his own party, Fillmore set a
new standard on removals and helped to entrench the principle of
rotation in office as a fact of constitutional life.
Third, Fillmore generally appointed people who were loyal to him
100
and to the Compromise. An additional criterion for cabinet selections was a sworn commitment not to become a candidate in the next
presidential election. Although Fillmore’s appointment preferences
were designed to heal the Whig party and to unify support for his policies within his administration, his purpose was undercut by his purposeful exclusion of Whigs, particularly from the North, who had
supported the Wilmot Proviso and Taylor. Moreover, in seeking to
implement these preferences, he was acting in a decidedly nonWhiggish manner. He rejected William Seward’s entreaty that he re-
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See generally SMITH, supra note 80, at 171–94 (recounting Fillmore’s role in the Compromise of 1850).
See generally id. at 167–68 (explaining the political motivations behind Fillmore’s cabinet
appointments).
WHITE, supra note 28, at 312.
See ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 689 (1997) (articulating
Webster’s influence on President Fillmore’s appointments to the State Department).
See SMITH, supra note 80, at 167–68 (discussing Fillmore’s cabinet appointments).
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tain Taylor’s Cabinet, and pointedly did not turn to Whig or Democratic leaders in Congress to advise him on his Cabinet. Instead, he
followed his own counsel in appointing Webster as Secretary of State,
and consulted primarily with Webster and Clay on sub-cabinet appointments. The end result was that, whereas Southerners had been
a majority in Taylor’s Cabinet, they held only three of the seven seats
in Fillmore’s Cabinet. The four other seats were all held by Northerners, though none were agreeable to Northern Whigs like Seward
101
or Thurlow Weed.
Fillmore followed a similar tact in his one successful Supreme
102
Court appointment. When Associate Justice Levi Woodbury of New
Hampshire died in September 1851, Fillmore turned to Webster, but
notably not other congressional leaders, for advice. Webster recommended Benjamin Curtis, a faithful Whig who had actually opposed
the Fugitive Slave Act. Within the region (and nation), Curtis was
widely regarded as both a lawyer and scholar. Although Democrats
held a majority 35-24 in the Senate, Curtis was quickly confirmed by
103
voice vote.
But, Fillmore took a different and ultimately unsuccessful tact in
104
trying to fill the other vacancy that arose during his presidency.
This vacancy arose in the summer of 1852 when Associate Justice
John McKinley died. In trying to fill this vacancy, Fillmore accepted,
as he had with his nomination of Curtis, the practice of trying to fill a
vacancy with someone from the same circuit as the Justice being replaced. This time, Fillmore made four different nominations to fill
the position, but all were in vain. First, he nominated a Whig lawyer,
Edward Bradford, but the Senate, still led by Democrats but who were
now eager to keep the vacancy open for the next President to fill,
quickly tabled the nomination. Fillmore next tried to take advantage
of the principle of senatorial courtesy—the Senate’s historic deference to nominations of one of its own to confirmable offenses. He
nominated United States Senator George Badger of North Carolina,
a Whig whom Fillmore believed would be generally agreeable as not
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Id. at 168 (describing the geographic and political makeup of Fillmore’s Cabinet).
See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 73, at 109–10 (describing the motivations behind the
Curtis nomination).
Six years later, Curtis resigned from the Court to protest its decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). After leaving the Court, Curtis became one of the nation’s most distinguished appellate advocates. He argued fifty-four cases before the
Court, and successfully defended President Andrew Johnson in his Senate impeachment
trial.
See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 73, at 110–11 (detailing Fillmore’s failed attempts to fill
the McKinley vacancy).
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overly partisan and as a colleague. The Senate proved him wrong
when it postponed any action by a single vote (in a rare instance of
not complying with senatorial courtesy). Fillmore’s next nomination
also tried to take advantage of senatorial courtesy, but this time he
took the unusual step of nominating a Democrat in an ironically
Whiggish attempt to defer to the will of a majority of the Senate.
Though the Senate confirmed his nomination of the newly elected
Democratic Senator Judah Benjamin of Louisiana, Benjamin declined the appointment. Running out of time, Fillmore opted to
nominate Benjamin’s law partner, William Micou, a Whig whom he
hoped Democrats would find agreeable because of his close association with Benjamin. Again, the Senate proved him wrong, tabling the
nomination. With Franklin Pierce’s inauguration only two weeks
away, Fillmore had run out of time, and the Democrats had successfully preserved the vacancy for Pierce to fill. Fillmore’s failures were
historic: he was responsible for the second largest number of failed
nominations made by a President to fill a single seat, and he had
helped to establish an informal norm (still extant) in which the Senate tries to preserve for the next President to fill any vacancy that
arises in a presidential election year.
Fourth, Fillmore only consulted his Cabinet when he saw fit. By
the time he came into office, Whigs had largely abandoned their
principle of allowing the Cabinet to determine administration policies by majority vote. Indeed, on the most important constitutional
question to come before him as President—the constitutionality of
the Fugitive Slave Act, he consulted only with Daniel Webster and his
105
Attorney General, John Crittenden.
Fillmore’s next rejection of the Whig constitutional philosophy of
the presidency also occurred within his first month in office. Although he had signaled in his first message to Congress his (Whiggish) willingness to approve the compromise evolving in Congress,
the first bit of news in the message sent shockwaves around the Capitol and violated the Whig orthodoxy on presidential power. Without
consulting with congressional leaders, Fillmore decided to send an
additional 750 troops to Santa Fe to stop a Texas invasion of New
106
Mexico. Like Taylor before him, Fillmore did not wait for Congress
to act, and so there was no law specifically authorizing the President
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See SMITH, supra note 80, at 200 (discussing Crittenden’s opinion of the constitutionality
of the Fugitive Slave Act); see also Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Bill, 5 Op. Att’y
Gen. 254 (1850).
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See SMITH, supra note 80, at 168–69 (describing Fillmore’s use of the military in New Mexico).
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to send troops to New Mexico, even to protect against a threatened
invasion of United States property. In not waiting for more specific
authorization, Fillmore seemed also to be making the larger point
that the authority at stake was strictly that of the federal government.
Through his actions and statements, he was emphasizing that a state
lacked the authority to assert, by force or otherwise, the authority
vested in the Congress by the Constitution to resolve boundary disputes within the United States.
Last but not least, Fillmore, with the help of his Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster, strenuously opposed the threats of several northern
states to protest the Fugitive Slave Act and ordered federal troops to
ensure enforcement of the controversial federal law when it faced re107
sistance in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.
To support their actions, Fillmore and Webster delivered extensive, public statements
against the constitutionality of secession and the need for vigorous,
108
uniform enforcement of the law to preserve the Union.
But, neither man deferred to congressional leaders in advancing the case for
presidential action to ensure enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.
Such initiative further buried the Whig conception of the presidency.
III. POSSIBLE LESSONS ON DEPARTMENTALISM
This final Part considers several significant lessons that can be derived from the case study in Part II. First, the case study shows that
the Constitution actually matters. Although it is tempting to think
that Presidents and members of Congress act strictly in their selfinterest, the case study shows how Harrison, Tyler, Taylor, Fillmore,
and others actually conformed their actions to what they believed the
Constitution required or allowed. Sometimes, they did so against
their self-interest. Harrison, Tyler, and Taylor chose to alienate Clay
in spite of the fact that they would have been better off politically
with Clay as an ally than an enemy. Fillmore sacrificed any chance to
the election to the presidency in his own right by choosing to
staunchly defend the constitutionality and the need for vigorous, uniform enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. The point is not whether
one can take issue with their particular constitutional or political
judgments that they each made but rather that their judgments had
discernible constitutional consequences.
107
108

See generally id. at 210–16 (describing Fillmore’s detest of slavery but commitment to enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act).
See, e.g., REMINI, supra note 99, at 724–28 (detailing speeches by Fillmore and Webster
discussing the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act).
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Second, the case study shows how important role-playing can be in
109
People might conform their behavior rethe federal government.
garding an office’s powers and limitations once they hold the position. As President, Tyler gravitated toward emulating Jackson in spite
of the criticism he leveled against Jackson as President, and Fillmore
as President was willing to compromise his long-held views about the
110
Wilmot Proviso to save the Union.
Third, the case study shows how the Supreme Court was peripheral to, if not completely uninvolved with, the demise of the Whig
conception of the presidency. Indeed, neither Congress nor the
Presidents in the period from 1840 to 1852 turned to the Court to
decide the fate of the Whig conception of the presidency. This conception collapsed solely because of what Presidents and members of
Congress did, not what the Court said or did.
Fourth, the case study illustrates how departmentalism is a function of constitutional construction and non-judicial precedent. On
the one hand, the Whig conception of the presidency collapsed largely because of both the blows struck against it by Presidents and the
concomitant failures of Congress to prop it back up. Moreover, it is
important to recognize that even as the Whig conception of the presidency was collapsing, congressional power was not receding. For instance, Tyler and Fillmore each effectively reached an impasse with
the Senate over Supreme Court appointments that ultimately bolstered senatorial power.
Fifth, the collapse of the Whig conception of the presidency was
not, and should not, be construed as a vindication of the unitary theory of the executive. It is true that Harrison, Tyler, Taylor, and Fillmore each failed to conform to the Whig orthodoxy on the presidency, but their resistance was not grounded on a fully articulated
endorsement of the unitary theory of the executive as we now know
it. Indeed, none of them ever expressly endorsed the theory. Moreover, sometimes these Presidents took stands that conflicted with this
theory. For instance, it does not appear that Tyler or Taylor agreed
with the notion of an absolute executive privilege, the notion that a
President has complete, unilateral discretion over what information
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I owe this insight to Fred Greenstein, Professor Emeritus at Princeton. Citing the social
science literature on role-playing, Professor Greenstein suggested, in a conversation on
April 21, 2009, that the case study is consistent with the social science literature showing
that a person’s perceptions or actions might depend on where the person is situated in
the government or the office that he or she occupies.
Cf. SMITH, supra note 80, at 165 (discussing the impetus for Fillmore’s altered stance on
the Wilmot Proviso).
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produced in the executive branch to maintain as confidential or to
disclose. While such a notion seems consistent with, if not a part of,
the unitary theory of the executive, Tyler often acquiesced to congressional documents and even produced internal executive branch
documents without recognizing or claiming to have waived any appli111
cable executive privilege. Nor did the Presidents who served from
1840–1852 expressly support the President’s authority to remove anyone exercising executive power anywhere in the government. Taylor, Tyler, and Fillmore apparently thought they had such authority
as reflected in their systematic efforts to reorganize their administrations with people who were personally or politically loyal to them and
not just the Whig Party. Tyler and Fillmore did replace their Cabinets but only because of the mass resignations of their cabinet officers rather than the exercise of their removal power. Harrison actually endorsed at least some civil service reform which would have put
112
some limits on the President’s removal authority, and, as Calabresi
113
and Yoo point out, Congress rejected Tyler’s Exchequer plan and
presumably with it, the single most extensive endorsement he made
of the unitary theory of the executive.
Another important lesson is the limited utility of a given case
study. Although I have given a few examples of the blows struck by
Harrison, Tyler, Taylor, and Fillmore against the Whig conception of
the presidency and the congressional responses to their respective
blows, there is more, much more, to the story of the demise of the
Whig conception of the presidency than I have related. It is especially important, in light of the present Symposium, to recognize that
each of these Presidents sometimes embraced this conception and
thus rejected or acted contrary to the unitary theory of the executive.
For instance, Fillmore did not issue a single veto during his tenure as
114
President, and Tyler, in spite of his aggressive exercises of his veto
authority on six occasions, signed off on much of the Whigs’ domestic policy agenda during his presidency, including an early bank-
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See PETERSON, supra note 27, at 171 (decribing how Tyler complied with the House, sending its members information concerning an executive investigation of the Cherokee Indians).
See id. at 39–40 (explaining how Harrison balanced political pressure with his commitment to improving the civil-service system).
See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 134 (discussing Tyler’s plan for an an Independent
Board of Exchequer and its failed enactment).
ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 39, 57 (1988).
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115

ruptcy law. We should not read too much into a single case study,
whether it be mine or those comprising The Unitary Executive; these
are all incomplete accounts of departmentalism.
Last but not least, Matthew Adler is correct when he suggested as
moderator of our panel that my positive account of departmentalism
116
has certain normative consequences. One is that it cuts against the
notion of judicial supremacy. My case study is a single example of
departmentalism at work, but it reinforces the point I have made
elsewhere that judicial supremacy is not a fact of much constitutional
117
life.
Another normative consequence of my positive account is that it
suggests the practical impossibility that the unitary theory of the executive could ever be, or will ever be, fully implemented. The reason
is simple: it is because departmentalism, as I have shown, is shaped
both through internal interactions within a branch and external interactions with the other branches. The unitary theory of the executive, in its fullest form, poses a threat to a substantial number of laws
that Presidents have signed and enforced in the past, by which the
Congress still stands, and the Supreme Court has upheld. It is at this
juncture that the force of precedent, both judicial and non-judicial,
comes fully into play, for the full and complete implementation of
the unitary theory of the executive is only possible if the leaders of all
three branches of the federal government agree—and stick to their
agreement over time—to abandon over two centuries of non-judicial
precedents pertaining to presidential and congressional power. It is
hard to imagine that the world of checks and balances can be made
entirely anew to that extent.
CONCLUSION
The Unitary Executive is a singular achievement. It provides excellent case studies of the extent to which each President from Washington to Bush has recognized or tried to implement the unitary theory
of the executive.
But, their account, as rich it is, tells only part of a larger story: the
comprehensive history of the development of presidential power over
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See Richard P. McCormick, William Henry Harrison and John Tyler, in THE PRESIDENTS: A
REFERENCE HISTORY 146–47 (Henry F. Graff ed., 2d ed. 1997) (discussing Tyler’s policies
in office).
I am grateful to Professor Adler for raising this point in the discussion after our panel’s
presentations.
See Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 5.
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time. Professors Yoo and Calabresi have given us the perspective of
Presidents on the unilateral theory of the executive, but every President as well as members of Congress, not to mention the Supreme
Court, has taken nuanced views of presidential power and often exercise power in contested circumstances. The history of the interaction
of the branches, particularly the President and Congress, is a history
of constitutional construction and the forging of non-judicial precedents, which shape dynamically the exercises of presidential and congressional powers.
Departmentalism might not work quite as precisely as the principle in physics that for every action there is a reaction; however, it is a
function of the interaction of the branches over time. Presidential
power does not develop in a vacuum; it has developed not only at the
expense of congressional power but in concert with the growth of
congressional power. We cannot understand one without the other.

